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Abstract
Open networks give actors non-redundant information that is diverse, while
closed networks offer redundant information that is easier to interpret.
Integrating arguments about network structure and the similarity of actors’
knowledge, we propose two types of network configurations that combine
diversity and ease of interpretation. Closed-diverse networks offer diversity
in actors’ knowledge domains and shared third-party ties to help in interpret-
ing that knowledge. In open-specialized networks, structural holes offer
diversity, while shared interpretive schema and overlap between received
information and actors’ prior knowledge help in interpreting new information
without the help of third parties. In contrast, actors in open-diverse networks
suffer from information overload due to the lack of shared schema or overlap-
ping prior knowledge for the interpretation of diverse information, and actors
in closed-specialized networks suffer from overembeddedness because they
cannot access diverse information. Using CrunchBase data on early-stage
venture capital investments in the U.S. information technology sector, we
test the effect of investors’ social capital on the success of their portfolio
ventures. We find that ventures have the highest chances of success if their
syndicating investors have either open-specialized or closed-diverse net-
works. These effects are manifested beyond the direct effects of ventures’
or investors’ quality and are robust to controlling for the possibility that
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certain investors could have chosen more promising ventures at the time of
first funding.
Keywords: social capital, network, startups, brokerage, structural holes, clo-
sure, network diversity, actors’ knowledge similarity, information redundancy,
venture capital
Social capital and network theorizing shape our thinking about how individuals
and organizations derive information advantages from the networks in which
they are embedded (Kwon and Adler, 2014). There is a strong research tradition
in management around the structural dimension of social capital (Kilduff and
Brass, 2010), with a central debate revolving around which network structures
provide greater information advantages: open, sparse structures rich in struc-
tural holes or closed, dense structures with many shared third-party ties (e.g.,
Ahuja, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Burt, 2005). Open networks are
thought to yield information advantages in the form of access to diverse infor-
mation (Burt, 2004), because information obtained from mutually unconnected
parties—that is, from across a structural hole—is likely to be non-redundant. In
contrast, being embedded in closed, densely connected networks is believed
to allow access to detailed and in-depth information that is easier to interpret.
In closed networks, pairs of actors have many joint third-party connections that
induce trust in and commitment to their relationship and that create information
redundancy, which in turn allows for greater capacity to transmit information
(Uzzi, 1996; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011). The
question is how network actors can access diverse information that they can
also effectively interpret.
Generally, actors in open networks have access to diverse information but
also may have limited means to interpret it (Shipilov and Li, 2008).
Interpretation may be particularly challenging because information providers in
open networks may give little contextual information that could help interpreta-
tion (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011) and have little incentive to be accurate and
unbiased (Schilling and Fang, 2014). The literature on open networks and struc-
tural holes has been largely silent about how actors in open networks effec-
tively absorb the diverse information they access. It treats the interpretive
ability of actors as exogenously determined rather than as a function of the net-
work’s structure and composition.
Conversely, actors in closed networks can more easily interpret information
yet may lack requisite diversity. Uzzi (1996) argued that the repeated interac-
tions within closely tied groups of actors typical of closed networks carry the
risk of a strong convergence of ideas and insights that, combined with a lack of
inflow of information from sparse connections, can lead to a lack of information
diversity. Although subsequent research has advanced our understanding of
how diversity in closed networks can help overcome such problems (Reagans
and McEvily, 2003; Rodan and Galunic, 2004; Fleming, Mingo, and Chen,
2007), our understanding of the mechanisms that allow shared third parties to
contribute to the interpretation of diverse knowledge may be incomplete.
Research has emphasized the indirect benefits provided by shared third parties,
such as induced commitment and trust (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Tortoriello
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and Krackhardt, 2010; Tortoriello, Reagans, and McEvily, 2012), but has
neglected that third parties can contribute more directly through the collective
interpretation of the information they also receive from the same shared alter.
To integrate into network theory the ability of network actors to interpret
information, we must consider both network structure and actors’ knowledge
similarity to fully understand how actors obtain and effectively interpret diverse
information. Building on research on network range (Reagans and McEvily,
2003), knowledge heterogeneity (Rodan and Galunic, 2004; Fleming, Mingo,
and Chen, 2007), and boundary spanning (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997;
Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010), we define actors’ knowledge similarity as the
extent to which network actors specialize in the same knowledge domains.
We argue that actors can most effectively access and interpret diverse infor-
mation from two prototypical network configurations. First, closed-diverse net-
works feature numerous shared third-party ties among dissimilar actors. In this
case, access to diverse information is enabled by the heterogeneity of the
actors’ knowledge domains, and shared third-party connections are a conduit
that allows corroboration of potentially different interpretations of that diverse
information via triangulation (Brown and Duguid, 1998; Gavetti and Warglien,
2015). Closed-diverse networks may offer advantages over both closed-
specialized networks, which lack information diversity, and open-diverse net-
works, which provide information that cannot be interpreted effectively.
Second, open-specialized networks are sparse structures among actors with
similar specializations. In those networks, the focus on similar knowledge
domains is accompanied by shared interpretive schema (Simon and
Feigenbaum, 1964; Simon, 1966; Brewer and Nakamura, 1984) and redun-
dancy between the information received and the receiver’s prior information
(Shannon and Weaver, 1948), helping actors interpret new information without
the help of third parties. Open-specialized networks are likely to offer benefits
over open-diverse networks, which lack shared interpretive schema, and
closed-specialized networks, in which diversity is compromised. Thus open-
specialized and closed-diverse networks should provide the best of both worlds
by combining the diversity stemming from the network structural dimension
with the ability to interpret information deriving from the actors’ knowledge
similarity dimension, and vice versa.
We test our arguments by studying the value of investors’ social capital to
the early-stage ventures in which they invest. Ventures that receive investor
funding gain not only from access to those investors’ financial and human capi-
tal but also because the investors act as important channels of information that
can give a new venture a competitive edge (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu,
2007; Hallen, 2008; Lungeanu and Zajac, 2015; Pahnke, Katila, and Eisenhardt,
2015). Investors and the networks they build through syndication constitute an
important form of social capital that new ventures can exploit to sustain profit-
ability and long-term survival (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001). New ventures benefit from their investors’ access to diverse
insights from across various domains, provided that the investors are able to
interpret this information and apply it to the specific domain of the venture. We
examine how the information advantages that newly funded early-stage ven-
tures obtain from the syndication networks of their first-round investors contrib-
ute to their success in attracting additional funding.
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THE VALUE OF INVESTORS’ SOCIAL CAPITAL TO FUNDED VENTURES
Syndication relationships are a key ingredient of investors’ social capital, as
prior syndication relationships allow investors to build networks that offer infor-
mational advantages to support their investment decisions (Bygrave, 1987;
Hsu, 2006; Dimov and Milanov, 2010; Milanov and Shepherd, 2013; Liu and
Maula, 2015). Embeddedness in syndication networks offers investors informa-
tion about new investment opportunities that is shared within a high-trust envi-
ronment and is not accessible to those outside the network (Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001). For example, venture capitalists with high social capital have a
higher willingness to invest large sums in startups because their privileged
access to information on a venture’s quality lowers the perceived risk of the
investment and increases the evaluation of future cash flows (Alexy et al.,
2012).
The social capital that investors build through past syndication experience is
an important asset for both the investors and the invested venture (Hochberg,
Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; Hallen, 2008). After a new venture’s first investment
round, its investors typically assume an advisory role, which makes their accu-
mulated social capital from past investment activities available to the venture.
This fosters the venture’s development and increases the returns to the inves-
tors (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). For start-
ups, investors’ network resources are a form of second-order social capital that
provides key advantages (Galunic, Ertug, and Gargiulo, 2012). Investors typi-
cally need to be actively involved to help early-stage ventures grow, but inves-
tors’ own resources and knowledge may be insufficient for them to provide
high-quality advice. Several studies have shown that the number of an inves-
tor’s network connections positively affects the performance of the funded
venture (e.g., Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007), ultimately increasing the
likelihood of a successful exit (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Hsu, 2006; Fitza,
Matusik, and Mosakowski, 2009). Two aspects of investors’ social capital may
be particularly valuable to their portfolio companies: (1) the informational diver-
sity in their network and (2) their ability to interpret how that information applies
to the specific context of the venture.
First, the value of investors’ social capital to their portfolio firms is a function
of their access to diverse information on which they can base their advice
(Lungeanu and Zajac, 2015). Individual investors might have deep sector-
specific and location-specific expertise, but diversity of expertise from across
one’s own domain is also important in this context (Bellavitis, Filatotchev, and
Kamuriwo, 2014). Syndication with other investors exposes investors to unfa-
miliar information and insights into other sectors and locations (Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; Liu and Maula, 2015).
Although investors tend to syndicate with others with similar industry profiles
(Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), heterogeneous syndication ties are formed every
time investors with different backgrounds and portfolios are attracted to the
same target companies (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008), when they bring comple-
mentary resource endowments to the investment (Hochberg, Lindsey, and
Westerfield, 2015), or when investors decide to alter their investment policies
on the basis of inconsistent performance feedback from prior investments
(Baum et al., 2005). Insights from one setting or knowledge domain can poten-
tially be valuable in some other setting in providing a new solution unknown in
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that setting (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Hsu and Lim, 2014) or bringing a new
perspective to a problem (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Perry-Smith, 2006).
Second, the syndicate’s ability to interpret diverse information meaningfully
cannot be taken for granted. There may be interpretive barriers to understand-
ing the information and assessing its value (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin,
1956; Simon and Feigenbaum, 1964; Dougherty, 1992), which may limit inves-
tors’ ability to integrate information from various sources to generate new
insights (Simon, 1966; Mors, 2010; Wadhwa, Phelps, and Kotha, 2016). The
quality of the advice provided to portfolio ventures will depend on investors’
ability to interpret the information obtained and to assess how it could be
applied to the venture’s specific setting, which may in turn depend on whether
the investors’ social capital comes from open versus closed networks, and spe-
cialized versus diverse networks.
Network Closure: Open vs. Closed Syndication Networks
In the network literature, network structure is argued to shape the informa-
tional advantages actors can derive from their social capital (e.g., Zukin and
DiMaggio, 1990; Granovetter, 1992), triggering debate over which network
structures provide the greatest informational advantages. The debate revolves
around a defining aspect of network structure: the level of redundancy in the
information that actors can access from the network (Burt, 1992). Redundancy
is a function of the degree of closure among a focal actor’s direct ties. An actor
connected to two alters who are directly connected to each other will likely
access redundant information (Coleman, 1990; Uzzi, 1996). If the alters are
unconnected—if the focal actor spans a structural hole—the information they
provide to the focal actor is likely to be non-redundant (Burt, 1992, 2004). Both
redundant and non-redundant information provide important advantages, and
both are considered pivotal to social capital. Some researchers suggest that
these advantages are not necessarily irreconcilable. For example, the timing
might differ in that advantages from structural holes may emerge more quickly
and be more short-lived than those from closure (Soda, Usai, and Zaheer, 2004;
Zaheer and Soda, 2009; Baum, McEvily, and Rowley, 2012). Also, the advan-
tages of open and closed networks may operate at different levels in the net-
work, for example within or beyond teams (Zaheer and Soda, 2009). Finally,
open and closed structures might coexist concurrently and at the same level in
a network (Oh, Chung, and Labianca, 2004; Schilling and Phelps, 2007;
Reagans and McEvily, 2008). Although these studies suggest important contin-
gencies related to the value of structural holes and closure, they do not address
how networks can combine the advantages of redundant information in closed
networks and the advantages of non-redundant information in open networks.
On the one hand, information redundancy associated with closed networks
is considered advantageous because it eases interpretation. There is a high like-
lihood that the same information may reach network actors via multiple routes
in the network. Given that various providers may communicate the information
differently, redundancy enables information receivers to cross-check or triangu-
late the information (Krackhardt, 1999; Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010). As
Shannon and Weaver (1948) argued, redundant information reduces the prob-
ability of interpretation error because information receivers may understand dif-
ferent aspects of a particular message from different sources. In certain
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circumstances, new information may be judged credible only if confirmed by
multiple sources (Centola and Macy, 2007). The interpretation of information in
closed networks is eased also by the increased channel bandwidth of ties in
such networks (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011): information richness and detail are
enhanced because two parties are more committed to the exchange if they
have a common third party (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). The increased trans-
mission capacity allows for the exchange of sensitive and complex information
(Fleming, Mingo, and Chen, 2007).
On the other hand, the flows of non-redundant information typical of open
networks may be advantageous because they tend to incorporate greater infor-
mation diversity, which can help change or challenge existing perspectives
(Burt, 1992, 2004). Network actors who connect otherwise disconnected indi-
viduals gain access to information that is diverse and that they can exploit to
their own advantage (Burt, 1992) or use instrumentally to establish collabora-
tion between previously disconnected parties (Obstfeld, 2005; Lingo and
O’Mahony, 2010).
A theoretical tension related to the value of open versus closed networks
arises because the ease-of-interpretation advantage of redundant information in
closed networks is lacking in open networks, and the diversity advantage of
non-redundant information in open networks is lacking in closed networks. The
literature on open networks—with the exception of process studies on broker-
age (Obstfeld, 2005; Lingo and O’Mahony, 2010)—does not elaborate how
actors interpret information (Burt, 2010). In the structuralist tradition of
research on open networks, actors accessing diverse information from struc-
tural holes are implicitly ascribed the ability to process it effectively and use it
to their advantage. But actors receiving diverse information in the absence of
redundancy from overlapping ties and without the ability to triangulate the infor-
mation to ease its interpretation may not be able to process and use it effec-
tively (Coleman, 1990; Shipilov and Li, 2008). The assumption of actors’
interpretive ability is particularly problematic because information providers in
open networks have few incentives to expend effort and time on information
exchange, which leads to reduced richness and detail in the information pro-
vided (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011), and they lack pressure from shared third
parties not to behave opportunistically (Burt, 2005; Shipilov and Li, 2008;
Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010). In contrast, closed networks can suffer from
a lack of non-redundancy. From a purely structuralist perspective, actors in
closed networks have access to rich, detailed information they can effectively
interpret but that potentially lacks diversity (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi,
2000). Repeated interactions among close-knit groups of actors could lead to
the convergence of ideas and insights that, combined with a lack of inflow from
sparse connections, reduces information diversity and introduces the risk of
groupthink. Network actors in closed networks can fail to challenge collectively
held beliefs and become trapped in their own nets (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and
Benassi, 2000).
In the context of social capital in syndication networks, open networks occur
if only some pairs of investors have prior syndicated investments. These net-
works contain non-redundant, diverse perspectives on the elements contribut-
ing to venture success, but it may be difficult for the investors to make sense
of how insights from non-shared investments might apply in a new context.
Closed networks among groups of investors occur if most actor pairs have
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co-invested in the past. In these networks, there is redundant information on
what was or was not successful in past portfolio companies, which facilitates
the formation of shared beliefs among network actors about why ventures suc-
ceed or fail, but it introduces the risk of taken-for-granted views and ingrained
assumptions going unchallenged.
Actors’ Knowledge Similarity: Specialized vs. Diverse
Syndication Networks
A network structural perspective alone does not explain how network actors
gain access to diverse and interpretable information. The level of information
diversity and the ability of network actors to interpret that information depend
also on the heterogeneity of these actors’ knowledge. The interplay between
network structure—open versus closed networks—and actors’ knowledge
similarity—diverse versus specialized networks—offers a solution to the puzzle
of how actors can access information that is both diverse and interpretable.
A number of studies suggest that the relative similarity of the actors in a
network—in addition to its structure—facilitates access to diverse information
and affects actors’ ability to interpret it. We build on the concepts of network
range (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Tortoriello, Reagans, and McEvily, 2012)
and knowledge heterogeneity (Rodan and Galunic, 2004) to emphasize that the
information value of social capital depends not only on network structure but
also on the knowledge properties of the network actors. We define actors’
knowledge similarity as the extent to which network actors are specialized rela-
tive to one another. In specialized networks, actors focus on similar knowledge
domains, and most of the information circulating tends to fall within those
domains. Diverse networks have actors specialized in dissimilar knowledge
domains and thus can provide access to unfamiliar information. In the context
of syndication networks, specialization occurs when the investors in a network
are similar in terms of the sectoral focus of their past investments. Actors’
knowledge similarity differs from network range in that the former captures not
the dispersion of the knowledge in the network but the extent to which the
network actors are similar (Harrison and Klein, 2007). If each actor spans many
domains and these domains are the same for all actors, the range (dispersion)
is high and actors’ similarity is also high.
Building on the argument that ventures thrive when their investors advise
them with diverse information they can sensibly interpret and apply to the ven-
ture’s context (Lungeanu and Zajac, 2015; Wadhwa, Phelps, and Kotha, 2016),
the level of actors’ knowledge similarity should moderate the relationship
between syndication network closure and venture success. Specifically, actors’
knowledge similarity should also influence the level of information redundancy
or non-redundancy in the network. Thus including knowledge similarity in net-
work theorizing is key to determining how networks can provide access to
information that is both diverse and interpretable. Figure 1 depicts the network
configurations that combine the network structure and actors’ knowledge simi-
larity properties of a syndication network and summarizes the value that these
configurations of investors’ social capital embody for the ventures in which
they invest.
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The Value of Closed-diverse Syndication Networks
The first type of syndication network (figure 1, upper right) that provides
diverse, interpretable information has a high level of network closure among
diverse network actors. This corresponds to a situation in which the focal inves-
tors and their past syndication partners have, in different compositions, regu-
larly co-invested in the past but are dissimilar in terms of their aggregate profile
of subsectors of past investments. That is, in addition to having co-investments
that produce high levels of closure, each of the network actors has been
involved in additional investments in other sectors. The flows of information in
these networks are likely to be rich because the presence of shared third par-
ties motivates the actors to spend time and effort on the exchange (Reagans
and McEvily, 2003).
Such closed-diverse networks offer a diversity advantage because each
actor can bring to the table insights into best practices, ongoing trends, and
developments from various sectors. This information is valuable in providing a
perspective on how domain-specific knowledge relates to knowledge in other
domains (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001;
Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). Exposure to insights from unfamiliar domains
can stimulate investors to reflect on their own knowledge domain, challenge
taken-for-granted views, and broaden the range of alternatives beyond those
common to the domain (e.g., Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Perry-Smith, 2006;
Gre´goire, Barr, and Shepherd, 2010).
Closed-diverse networks also offer built-in advantages for interpreting
diverse information. Information from outside the venture’s domain can be diffi-
cult to interpret (Dougherty, 1992; Bechky, 2003; Tortoriello and Krackhardt,
2010), and applying such information to a specific context is a non-trivial task
(Mors, 2010). Actors’ embeddedness in a closed-diverse network can ease the
interpretation of diverse information in two ways. First, two parties exchanging
information tend to be more committed to spending time and effort on the
exchange if they have common third-party connections (Reagans and McEvily,
2003). Awareness of common connections increases trust in the relationship
and discourages the willful provision of incorrect information (Coleman, 1990;
Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997; Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010; Rosenbaum,
Billinger, and Stieglitz, 2014). Investors may more easily interpret diverse infor-
mation from closed networks because alters expend more effort on communi-
cating insights from other settings in greater detail.
Second, the presence of shared third parties enables redundancy in interpre-
tive cues through triangulation, which can make interpretation easier. In closed
triadic structures, actors may receive the original information directly from the
information provider, as well as others’ interpretations of it via shared third par-
ties who likely received the same information from the provider. Paying atten-
tion to other people’s interpretations of the same information improves one’s
own interpretation (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Gavetti and Warglien, 2015). By
uncovering overlaps and differences in interpretation, focal actors can make
inferences about the accuracy of their own interpretations. This triangulation
process is effective specifically in diverse networks. Interpretation through
interaction is a distributed cognition process (Michel, 2007) that may be particu-
larly effective with heterogeneous alters who are likely to interpret the same
information differently and thus to offer the focal actor different versions of the
8 Administrative Science Quarterly XX (2016)
 at Imperial College London Library on March 7, 2016asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Figure 1. The interplay between network structure and actors’ knowledge similarity in
explaining informational advantage.*
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same story to triangulate. Thus groups of interconnected diverse actors provide
a platform for the collective interpretation of diverse information (Brown and
Duguid, 1998; Gavetti and Warglien, 2015; Tortoriello, McEvily, and Krackhardt,
2015).
In the context of investor syndication networks, investors may collectively
interpret the implications of new trends in emerging sectors for ventures in
their portfolio, perhaps exchanging and discussing the business plans of various
firms in the process (Bygrave, 1987; Hsu, 2006; Milanov and Shepherd, 2013;
Liu and Maula, 2015). The combined diversity and interpretation advantages of
closed-diverse networks imply that syndicates will be able to formulate high-
quality advice for the venture based on diverse information from various sec-
tors that trusted third parties have helped interpret and apply to this venture’s
particular subsector.
Syndicates with closed-diverse networks can provide more valuable informa-
tion to the venture than syndicates with closed-specialized networks, which
lack access to a variety of information from outside the venture’s domain
(figure 1, upper left). Members of close-knit groups can suffer from groupthink,
hesitating to explore new ideas, as they prefer the prevailing schema shared
within the group (Janis, 1972; Wang et al., 2013). The advantage of the infor-
mation richness typical of closed networks is undermined by the lack of non-
redundant information. The term overembeddedness was coined by Uzzi
(1997: 58) to describe such situations, in which ‘‘all firms in a network are con-
nected through embedded ties, [which] can reduce the flow of new and novel
information into the network because . . . there are few or no links to outside
actors who can potentially contribute innovative ideas.’’ We extend the concept
of overembeddedness to include the lack of inflow of novel ideas due to exces-
sive levels of actors’ knowledge similarity in the network. The downsides asso-
ciated with scarce connections to parties outside the dense cliques in the
network are exacerbated if the respective actors are very similar. Triangulation
does not work in closed-specialized networks and can even lead the actors to
believe that incorrect information is correct. Cross-checking information via
third parties who both received the original information from the same source
and interpreted it from the same perspective is unlikely to lead to interpretation
differences that can be triangulated. Hence inaccurate or outdated information
may remain unchallenged. Investors in a closed network of actors with similar
investment profiles are likely to give their ventures incomplete and possibly
biased advice; they have access to only a limited view of best practices, trends,
and developments in a specific sector, which may lead to advice based on
shared myths that are not challenged by the inflow of diverse information. This
limitation will be reflected by the venture’s lower levels of success.
Closed-diverse networks also offer advantages over open-diverse networks
(figure 1, lower right), in which the value and accuracy of the information can-
not be judged effectively because there are no opportunities for triangulation
through shared parties so information overload may become a problem. There
is also a risk that syndicates with open-diverse networks may advise ventures
based on information whose application to a particular sector or venture they
cannot adequately assess. Investors’ misinterpretations of how insights from
one sector may or may not transfer to another sector could damage the ven-
ture’s probability of success. Thus we predict that:
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Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Venture success is more likely if the investing syndicate has a
closed-diverse network rather than a closed-specialized or open-diverse network.
The Value of Open-specialized Syndication Networks
The second type of syndication network providing diverse, interpretable infor-
mation is a network with a low level of network closure among similarly specia-
lized network actors (figure 1, lower left). In open-specialized networks, actors
focus on the same knowledge domains but form networks rich in structural
holes. This corresponds to a situation in which focal investors and their past
syndication partners have little past experience of co-investment despite their
focus on the same subsectors. Actors in such networks have substantial incen-
tives to share information despite the absence of shared third parties, although
information depth and richness may be less. As with any other prior tie, the
sparse connections in open networks result from a previous shared commit-
ment, in our context a shared investment, which makes it more likely the two
parties will form a bond of trust and be ready to share information with each
other (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Information sharing in open-specialized net-
works is likely also because similarity breeds trust. Gulati and Sytch (2008: 182)
showed that ‘‘organizations that are more similar to each other can derive
greater stocks of trust from [their] joint history compared to more heteroge-
neous sets of partners.’’
Analogous to the value of closed-diverse networks, the value to ventures of
open-specialized syndication networks is based on the combination of non-
redundancy, which brings information diversity, and redundancy, which facili-
tates interpretation. Open-specialized networks have a diversity advantage: the
open structure safeguards the syndicate’s access to diverse, non-redundant
information because each network actor brings insights and experiences from
different investments, possibly in different geographic contexts (Lingo and
O’Mahony, 2010). Alters likely have different views about the sector-specific
ingredients for a venture’s success, helping investors to challenge and update
insights obtained from their specific experiences and to prevent local bias
(Ja¨a¨skela¨inen and Maula, 2014).
Open-specialized networks also have an ease-of-interpretation advantage.
Above we argued that, when considering structural arguments only, it is not
clear how actors in open networks can overcome the hurdles to interpretation
associated with information that is diverse, non-redundant, and potentially unfa-
miliar (Shipilov and Li, 2008) and is not as rich as information from closed net-
works (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011). We propose that actors in open networks
can overcome these barriers if their networks are specialized. Information
receivers will be better able to interpret information if it comes from similar oth-
ers and relates to a familiar domain (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, 1956). The
receiving actor’s prior knowledge creates redundancy with the received infor-
mation, which makes it easier to interpret and makes it understandable even if
it is incomplete or of poor quality (Shannon and Weaver, 1948). Information
receivers in open-specialized networks will have both the interpretive schema
to assess the meaning of information relative to what they already know and
the evaluation abilities to judge its relation to prior knowledge (Simon and
Feigenbaum, 1964; Simon, 1966; Brewer and Nakamura, 1984; Hwang, Singh,
and Argote, 2014). Thus, relative to information from outside the investor’s
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domain, the need for triangulation to interpret within-domain information and
the need for a sounding board to understand how it applies to the focal venture
are much reduced. This allows the information-receiving investors to interpret
information without the help of third parties (Hwang, Singh, and Argote, 2014)
and to advise ventures on the basis of diverse, properly interpreted
information.
Investors in open-specialized networks have access to a variety of insights
into how firms can succeed in a specific subsector. The views of the various
prior partners in their network will likely differ because of the structural holes
among them, so these partners have not come to a consensus on what makes
a successful business in the particular subsector. The familiarity of the
information-receiving investors with the sector, and their prior knowledge in
that domain, ensure that they can interpret and apply divergent views to decide
the best course for the focal venture even when the information accessed
lacks depth and detail and when there are no shared third parties on whose
interpretation they can rely. The combined diversity and interpretation advan-
tages of open-specialized networks imply that syndicates in such networks will
be able to formulate high-quality advice for the venture based on diverse infor-
mation from within the sector, which was effectively interpreted and applied
by tapping into prior knowledge of the domain.
Syndicates with open-specialized networks offer greater information value to
a venture than those with open-diverse networks (figure 1, lower right) in
which there is little or no redundancy between the information received and
the receiver’s prior knowledge and in which actors have no shared interpre-
tive schema. Borrowing from research on information processing (see, e.g.,
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, 1956; Simon, 1974; Sweller, 1988) and recent
research on networks (Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012), we use the term infor-
mation overload to describe a situation in which actors in an open and highly
diverse network lack the ability to correctly process the huge diversity of
information arising from both open structures and actors’ knowledge diver-
sity. In addition to the actors lacking the carrying capacity to deal with the
volume of diverse information (Simon, 1956; Hansen and Haas, 2001;
Hwang, Singh, and Argote, 2014), their ability to absorb and interpret it may
be compromised (Simon and Feigenbaum, 1964; Simon, 1966; Ghosh and
Rosenkopf, 2014). The absence of shared third parties to help corroborate
diverse information, as well as the reduced ability to make independent judg-
ments because of mismatches in investors’ interpretive schema and lack of
prior knowledge, implies that investors in open-diverse networks are not able
to interpret diverse information meaningfully. Investors with an open net-
work of actors with dissimilar investment profiles may provide investors with
unsound, speculative advice based on a broad range of insights from unfami-
liar sectors, which may have been misinterpreted and applied erroneously to
the context of the focal venture. Thus we argue that investors in open-
diverse networks are unable to formulate coherent advice that will be of
value to their ventures. Open-specialized syndication networks are also
superior to closed-specialized networks, which lack the requisite variety to
help investors update sector-specific insights and challenge assumptions.
Thus we predict:
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Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Venture success is more likely if the investing syndicate has
an open-specialized network rather than an open-diverse or closed-specialized
network.
Information Redundancy and Network Configuration
Both closed-diverse networks and open-specialized networks combine the
ease-of-interpretation advantages of information redundancy and the diversity
advantages of non-redundancy. First, this argument is based on the assumption
that information redundancy is a function of network closure and actors’ knowl-
edge heterogeneity. Regarding the former, we assume that open networks are
rich in structural holes, which are the basis of non-redundancy: investors
access diverse information through bridging ties across structural holes
between parties with no mutual prior syndication relations. Although structural
holes typically are pervasive in open networks, as shown in figure 2, diagrams
A and B, the number of bridging ties across structural holes in relatively open
networks also depends on the distribution of the alter–alter ties (dashed lines)
in the network. In diagram A, syndicate ABC has no bridging ties, because
there is no single alter with whom the syndicate has no third party in common.
In diagram B, syndicate ABC has two bridging ties. For both alters E and G
Figure 2. Structural holes and structural equivalence at equal levels of closure.
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there are no other alters in common with the syndicate. Networks with fewer
(or more) alter–alter ties always have lower (or higher) levels of redundancy,
but bridging ties may more accurately capture the level or lack of redundancy in
the network structure than the characterization as open or closed.
Second, information redundancy based on network structure depends not
only on the interconnectedness of the alters but also on the extent to which
these alters are structurally equivalent (Lorraine and White, 1971; Reagans and
Zuckerman, 2008)—that is, the extent to which they are tied to the same third
parties. Two unconnected investors may bring little diversity to the syndicate if
they are informed by the same investors in the second shell of the network
from the syndicate’s perspective (see figure 2, diagrams C and D). In diagram
C, members D and E—both alters of the syndicate ABC—are not structurally
equivalent because they have different third-party ties, F–G and H–I (shown as
dashed lines), respectively. In diagram D, members D and E are fully structu-
rally equivalent because they share the same third parties, G, H, and I. Closure
captures the redundancy of information that syndicate members may get from
alters’ direct participation in certain prior investments (the first network neigh-
borhood), while structural equivalence captures the redundancy of information
that alters may get from their alters and may pass on to the syndicate (the sec-
ond network neighborhood). We will explore how redundancy in the second
network neighborhood may moderate the value of redundancy in the first
neighborhood.
Third, in relation to closed-diverse networks, closure may have two separate
positive effects: the augmented effort of investors with shared third parties
and the ability to triangulate interpretive cues. We will try to disentangle these
two explanations empirically by introducing a control for tie strength, which
should correlate more with the first advantage than with the second.1
Fourth, we portray open-specialized and closed-diverse networks as equally
advantageous because both combine ease-of-interpretation and diversity
advantages. But open-specialized networks offer within-sector diversity,
whereas closed-diverse networks offer diversity from across sectoral bound-
aries. Starting from the notion that within-sector diversity may be more valu-
able for early-stage ventures in emerging industries, and between-sector
diversity may be more valuable for ventures in established sectors, we explore
how these two types of diversity may be advantageous for the success of dif-
ferent types of firms.
METHOD
Data
To test our hypotheses, we drew on CrunchBase (www.CrunchBase.com), a
public database that provides an almost complete overview of recent venture
capital funding in the U.S. information technology (IT) and Internet industry
(Block and Sandner, 2009; Alexy et al., 2012). CrunchBase data are the source
used by TechCrunch, a popular blog and major information source on startups,
especially in the IT and Internet sector. This database provides data on new
ventures, entrepreneurs, and investors in U.S. high-tech industries, including
funding histories and board compositions for both small private firms and large
1 We are indebted to one of our reviewers for this insightful suggestion.
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publicly listed corporations. Data on investors include information on business
angels, large venture capital funds such as Sequoia Capital, and corporate ven-
ture capital funds such as Siemens Venture Capital. In contrast to VentureXpert,
CrunchBase includes recently founded ventures and those that have not yet
received funding, allowing for fine-grained and reliable longitudinal data on syndi-
cation networks. We collected our CrunchBase data in May 2014 and had infor-
mation on 10,266 ventures that received funding in a total of 37,146 funding
rounds from 5,032 unique investors (primarily venture capital funds).
Because we were investigating the impact of syndication networks on addi-
tional funding, for our regressions we considered only firms that had received a
first round of funding; we also excluded firms with only one investor (i.e., non-
syndicated investments). We used all data to construct our network measures.
We limited the time frame of our analysis to ventures that received their first
funding between 2005 and 2011, so that we had sufficient time left to con-
struct network variables based on prior investments and sufficient data from
more recent years to observe ventures’ success events. Our final dataset
included 2,371 syndicated first-round investments involving 1,646 unique
investors.
In addition, to create some of our control variables, we constructed trade-
mark portfolios based on U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data, and we
obtained patent data from the PATSTAT database (version October 2013), pro-
vided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the European Patent Office, which contains all patent applications and
patents granted worldwide.
Dependent Variable
Our interest was in analyzing the effect of investors’ network structure and
actors’ knowledge similarity on venture success. We defined venture success
as the venture’s ability to attract a second round of funding. Firms active in
high-tech sectors typically require several rounds of funding at comparatively
short intervals to support the development and diffusion of their products and
services (Gompers, 1995). Thus receiving a second round of funding is a clear
and positive signal either that the initial investors are happy with the venture’s
progress and are willing to contribute additional resources or that the venture
has been able to attract new, possibly larger and more experienced investors
(e.g., Lerner, 1994; De Clercq et al., 2006). Although our sample included ven-
tures that received first-round investment between 2005 and 2011, we
observed second-round funding up to the end of 2013, which allowed us to
observe funding events even for the most recent companies given an average
time of 19 months between first- and second-round funding. CrunchBase data
are updated frequently and have been shown to be accurate, so we are confi-
dent that we did not miss any second-round funding events that occurred
before the end of 2013.
Independent Variables
Our independent variables relate to the syndicate’s social capital at the time of
first-round investment in the focal venture. Following the approach in Oh,
Chung, and Labianca (2004), we operationalized syndicate social capital as the
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aggregate ego-level network of the syndicate group. Thus the syndicate’s
social capital includes prior syndication relationships among syndicate mem-
bers, additional prior syndication partners of individual members, and potential
alter–alter ties between these partners. Ties are defined to exist between all
investor pairs that co-invested in a venture in the five years up to and including
the month prior to the focal investment. In the Online Appendix (http://asq
.sagepub.com/supplemental), figure A1 depicts the interplay between different
network structures and actors’ knowledge similarity in investment syndicates.
Investors A, B, and C syndicate a first-round investment in venture X at time t.
In all network configurations, A–B, A–C, and B–C have prior co-investments in
the preceding five-year period. Also, A previously syndicated with D and E, B
with E and F, and C with G. The prior syndication relationships between nodes
D, E, F, and G differ between open and closed networks. Our network closure
and actors’ knowledge similarity variables are calculated on the aggregate net-
work structure of nodes A to G.
Starting with our structure-related variables, network closure is a local den-
sity measure computed as the number of ties among network actors over the
maximum number of possible ties, N * N1ð Þ2 , where N is network size. The mea-
sure ranges from 0 (fully open network) to 1 (fully closed network) (see also
Obstfeld, 2005; Fleming, Mingo, and Chen, 2007). In the lower two quadrants
in figure A1, there are eight ties among 21 potential ties, yielding a closure
value of 0.38. We ran alternative specifications of our models with measures
for bridging ties, structural equivalence, and tie strength. Bridging ties—those
that span a structural hole—are measured as the proportion of the syndicate’s
links to prior partners that are bridging ties: ties to partners with no indirect ties
through mutual contacts (Burt, 2010). Ties are also considered bridging if two
syndicate members are tied to the same prior partner. Structural equivalence is
defined as the extent to which alters of a node (in our case, the syndicate)
overlap in their links to third parties, and it captures redundancy among alters’
information sources (Lorraine and White, 1971; Reagans and Zuckerman,
2008). For each alter, we compiled a list of third-party partners in the five years
before the focal investment. We computed a Jaccard coefficient of overlapping
partners for each pair of alters. Our measure of equivalence is expressed as
the average pairwise coefficient across all pairs. Finally, tie strength is a dummy
variable indicating that the investors in the network have syndicated with each
partner at least twice on average.
Actors’ knowledge similarity is obtained on the basis of the past investment
portfolios of all network actors, based again on their investments during the
five years preceding the focal investment. The technological specialization of
each investor in the network is described by a vector of length 32, where a cell
describes which fraction of investments was in startups in a specific subsector
of the IT industry. Actors’ knowledge similarity is calculated as the average
cross-product of the vectors for each pair of network actors (Bonacich, 1972).
In the two left-side quadrants in figure A1, all actors each invested 100 percent
in blue, except for node B, which invested 50 percent in blue and 50 percent in
green. It follows that the vector cross-products for the six dyads involving B
take the value 0.5 while the remaining 15 cross-products take the value 1, yield-
ing an average actors’ knowledge similarity score of [(6 × 0.5) + (15 × 1)] /
21 = 0.857. The actors’ knowledge similarity measure ranges from 0 (fully
diverse network) to 1 (fully specialized network).
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Control Variables
Our control variables are organized on three levels. The venture-level set
includes the log of the amount raised from the first round of funding, which
allows us to control for the initial startup conditions such as the founder’s social
capital and perceived quality of the idea. Shane and Stuart (2002: 160) argued
that if the effect on the first round of funding is properly accounted for, these
initial conditions will be of little importance for subsequent funding rounds. We
also included cumulative counts for patents and trademarks, which are impor-
tant quality signals (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004; Audretsch, Bo¨nte, and
Mahagaonkar, 2012; Block et al., 2014) and may have some liquidation value
should the startup fail, both aspects that might increase investors’ propensity
to invest (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Shane and Stuart, 2002; De Clercq et al.,
2006). For trademarks and patents, we relied on applications for intellectual
property protection rather than granted rights because granted rights often
involve a lengthy process and investors typically do not wait for their conclu-
sion. We identified all the legal applicants associated with all ventures in our
sample and accounted for misspelled names and complex organizational struc-
tures such as subsidiaries with different names or multiple legal entities. We
set the value for patents and trademarks to 0 for ventures for which we found
no data. Other venture-level controls included year of first funding to account
for cyclical effects (six dummies) (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher,
2005), IT subsector in which the venture is specialized (31 dummies), and three
location dummies for U.S. states with high concentrations of IT firms
(California, New York, Massachusetts) to account for the geographic clustering
of investments (see Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Chen et al., 2010).
The second set of control variables is at the investor level. To assess the
potential effect of overall quality or reputation of the first-round syndicate mem-
bers (Gu and Lu, 2014), we included the share of past portfolio companies that
were acquired, or held an initial public offering (IPO). We also obtained the ven-
ture capital reputation index as calculated annually by Lee, Pollock, and Jin
(2011), but because that variable was not available for all the investors in our
data, we excluded it from our models. Its inclusion does not affect our findings.
In line with extant research (Podolny, 2001; Shipilov and Li, 2008), we com-
puted eigenvector centrality to measure investor status. As this variable is
dependent on network size, we standardized it by total number of network
actors (i.e., all syndicate members and their prior partners). We also included
dummy variables for angel investors and corporate venture capitalists.
The third set of controls is at the level of the syndicate and its network. We
included syndicate size because larger syndicates might have larger pools of
resources, which might positively affect the venture’s chances of attracting a
second round of funding (Lerner, 1994). We included a measure for network
size without double-counting the contacts that multiple syndicate members
have (i.e., both A and B are connected to E). In the examples in figure A1, this
variable takes the value 4 for the syndicate’s relations to D, E, F, and G.
Estimation Method
To estimate the effect of syndication network properties on venture success,
we employed three estimation techniques. First, we used standard logit
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regression techniques with the venture–investor combination as the unit of
analysis. Although this method does not account for potential censoring issues,
the lagged structure of our dependent variable means these should be mini-
mized. Also, logit models are generally well suited to estimating discrete-time
events (Allison, 2010). Setting our unit of analysis at the venture–investor level
allowed us to account accurately for the non-independence of observations that
arose because ventures and investors occurred multiple times in our dataset,
by estimating robust standard errors and clustering them at the venture and
investor levels simultaneously (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011;
Kleinbaum, Stuart, and Tushman, 2013).2 We repeated all the estimations at
the venture–syndicate level of analysis, which has the advantage that it gives
equal sampling weight to each venture–syndicate observation regardless of
syndicate size (rather than sampling N times each venture with syndicate size
N ). Our results are robust to shifting to the venture–syndicate unit of analysis.
Likewise, adding sampling weights—the inverse of syndicate size—to the ven-
ture–investor-level analyses did not affect our estimates, suggesting that the
sampling issue does not bias our findings. We prioritize the non-
interdependence of observations at the investor level and report the venture–
investor-level analyses in the paper.
Second, we employed piecewise exponential regressions with occurrence
of and time to second-round funding as the dependent variable. We could not
use a standard Cox model because the proportionality assumption was vio-
lated. The piecewise exponential method allows accurate estimation of timing
effects and censoring and truncation issues, but because these models are at
the venture–syndicate level, they do not account for the possibility of investors
influencing multiple observations through involvement in multiple syndicates.
Logit models remain our preferred specification, partly also because it is ambig-
uous whether timing until further funding always signals success. For example,
entrepreneurs may purposefully delay further funding to resolve uncertainties
in a bid to achieve a higher valuation or to retain more equity in the next round
(Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012).
Third, we ran Heckman probit selection models to account for the possibility
that our results are driven by the ability of investors with high social capital to
select more promising ventures. We adopted the approach in Hallen (2008:
717) and matched each syndicate that made a first-round investment in a par-
ticular venture to ten random alternative ventures that received first-round
investment in the same year but from a different syndicate. After matching the
venture–syndicate dyads, we expanded the database to the venture–investor
level as in the main analysis. This makes for a better comparison and allows
standard errors to be clustered at the venture, investor, and syndicate levels to
account for the non-independence of observations. Our instrument is mean
geographic distance between syndicate and venture. We believe that the prox-
imity of a venture may make syndicate members more aware of some particu-
lar investment targets than others and thus affects selection. But we also
believe that geographic distance has a negligible effect on the odds of
2 Given that syndicate size might have a major influence on the values of our network variables, we
clustered standard errors also by syndicate size. Specifically, small syndicates are more likely to
have either high or low values of closure or actors’ knowledge similarity than intermediate values.
Thus the standard errors of network effects should be non-independent of syndicate size.
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successful further funding of a venture that already received first-round fund-
ing. In our sample, the difference in second funding success between firms at
below-median levels of distance from their investors (p = .52) and those at
above-median levels (p = .49) is marginal.
RESULTS
The Interplay between Network Closure and Actors’ Knowledge Similarity
Table 1 provides summary statistics and correlations for all the variables
included in the regressions. About half of the 2,371 ventures in the dataset that
received first-round funding attracted a second round of funding, with a mean
of 575 days between rounds. First-round syndicates have a mean size of 2.8
members and collectively have a mean beyond-syndicate network size of 74
investors. Table 2 shows that all four network configurations we investigated
occur frequently in the dataset.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations*
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Venture
1. Second funding received .51 .00 1.00
2. Raised amount first round (log) 1.22 .88 –1.39 2.30 .04
3. Number of patents .87 5.07 .00 112.00 –.02 .13
4. Number of trademarks 2.07 6.80 .00 220.00 –.07 .11 .29
Investor
5. Past portfolio companies acquired/IPO .02 .07 .00 1.00 .03 –.01 –.05 –.02
6. Status (eigenvector centrality) .00 .00 .00 .02 .05 .15 .02 .00 .06
7. Corporate venture capitalist .05 .00 1.00 –.02 –.07 –.01 .00 .02 –.06
8. Angel investor .03 .00 1.00 .00 –.24 –.03 –.02 .01 –.03 .02
Syndicate
9. Syndicate size 2.84 1.21 2.00 13.00 –.01 –.11 .08 .02 .00 –.22 .04
10. Network size 73.82 70.28 .00 381.00 .06 –.04 –.04 –.02 .26 –.03 .03
11. Network closure .17 .11 .00 1.00 –.03 –.06 –.03 –.03 –.06 .07 .00
12. Network specialization .11 .07 .00 1.00 .02 .19 .06 .01 –.08 .11 –.03
13. Bridging ties (proportion) .03 .08 .00 1.00 –.05 –.06 –.02 –.01 –.08 –.01 –.02
14. Structural equivalence (of alters) .02 .02 .00 .70 .03 –.09 –.02 –.04 .07 .10 .03
Variable Mean S.D. 8 9 10 11 12 13
Syndicate
9. Syndicate size 2.84 1.21 .07
10. Network size 73.82 70.28 .08 .38
11. Network closure .17 .11 –.01 –.25 –.45
12. Network specialization .11 .07 –.08 –.06 –.16 .48
13. Bridging ties (proportion) .03 .08 .02 –.13 –.24 .26 .10
14. Structural equivalence (of alters) .02 .02 .01 –.15 –.10 .40 .00 .02
* Correlations above |0.03| are significant at 5% level. N = 2,371 for venture and syndicate variables; N = 1,646 for
investor variables.
 Descriptive statistics show non-standardized variables, but variables were standardized before computation of
correlations and inclusion in regression models.
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Table 2. Co-occurrence of Low and High Levels of Network Closure and Actors’ Knowledge
Similarity
Network closure
Actors’ knowledge similarity
< Mean
(diverse networks)
≥ Mean
(specialized networks) Total
< Mean (open networks) 909 457 1,366
≥ Mean (closed networks) 517 488 1,005
Total 1,426 945 2,371
Table 3. Predicting Probability of Receiving Second Funding (Network Closure × Actors’
Knowledge Specialization)*
Variable
Model 1
Logit
venture
controls
Model 2
Logit
investor
controls
Model 3
Logit
network
controls
Model 4
Logit
main
effects
Model 5
Full model
(preferred
specification)
Model 6a
Sample
split:
diverse
networks
Model 6b
Sample
split:
specialized
networks
Model 7
Piecewise
exponential
full model
Model 8
part 1
Heckprobit
selection
equation
Model 8
part 2
Heckman
probit
success
equation
Venture
Mean distance to
investors
–.254
(.020)•••
Raised amount
1st round
.117 .103 .072 .073 .066 .151 .008 .011 –.006 .044
(.067)• (.057)• (.062) (.063) (.064) (.074)•• (.194) (.035) (.023) (.041)
Number of patents .002 .002 .004 .004 .003 .022 .004 –.008 .005 .002
(.010) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.012) (.019) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.007)
Number of
trademarks
–.044 –.044 –.043 –.043 –.043 –.016 –.071 –.023 .003 –.025
(.017)••• (.016)••• (.015)••• (.016)••• (.016)••• (.008)•• (.014)••• (.008)••• (.003) (.009)•••
Investor
Share of past
portfolio
companies
acquired/IPO
1.254 .969 .962 .956 .467 1.636 1.706 .099 .587
(.565)•• (.499)• (.498)• (.494)• (.557) (.647)•• (.370)••• (.064) (.304)•
Status (eigenvector
centrality)
19.896 9.496 8.833 3.959 14.930 –1.267 31.001 –6.072 2.975
(6.250)••• (4.159)•• (4.700)• (3.598) (10.182) (5.873) (10.327)••• (1.235)••• (2.457)
Angel investor .178 .176 .175 .180 .106 .590 .196 –.017 .112
(.351) (.332) (.330) (.322) (.306) (.574) (.237) (.033) (.204)
Corporate venture
capitalist
–.232 –.217 –.219 –.224 –.039 –.549 –.152 –.058 –.135
(.207) (.210) (.209) (.210) (.181) (.294)• (.159) (.016)••• (.132)
Syndicate
Syndicate size –.077 –.074 –.077 .014 –.215 –.033 .014 –.049
(.049) (.049) (.050) (.072) (.056)••• (.027) (.006)•• (.030)
Network size .002 .002 .002 .002 .001 .001 –.000 .002
(.001)•• (.001)••• (.001)•• (.001)• (.002) (.001)•• (.000)••• (.001)•••
Network closure .025 .030 .134 –.131 –.010 –.020 .019
(.063) (.064) (.057)•• (.062)•• (.016) (.007)••• (.038)
Actors’ knowledge
similarity
.003 .061 .044 .018 .035
(.050) (.058) (.011)••• (.007)•• (.032)
Network closure ×
Actors’ knowledge
similarity
–.035 –.023 .003 –.022
(.007)••• (.003)••• (.002)* (.004)•••
(continued)
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Table 3 presents the logit regression analysis. Model 1 includes only the
venture-level covariates. Investor-level and syndicate-level control variables are
introduced in models 2 and 3, respectively. Model 4 includes network closure
and actors’ knowledge similarity, neither of which have significant independent
effects on a venture’s success. Model 5 includes the interaction term between
network closure and actors’ knowledge similarity, which is negative and signifi-
cant, providing support for our hypotheses.
This result holds in both alternative specifications of the full model: taking
account of timing and censoring effects (model 7) and controlling for selection
(model 8). In the latter case, the marginally significant (at 10 percent) correlation
between the error terms of the selection and venture success equations
demonstrates that the selection process and the path to venture success are
not completely independent. Controlling for the determinants of selection, how-
ever, the sign and significance of the coefficients in the venture success part
of the model are consistent with the findings from model 5.
To gauge the nature of the interplay between network structure and actors’
knowledge similarity, and to illustrate the magnitude of the effects, figure 3
plots the interactions for a venture in the mobile communications sector in
California, which received first-round funding in 2005. We explored the use of
Table 3. (continued)
Variable
Model 1
Logit
venture
controls
Model 2
Logit
investor
controls
Model 3
Logit
network
controls
Model 4
Logit
main
effects
Model 5
Full model
(preferred
specification)
Model 6a
Sample
split:
diverse
networks
Model 6b
Sample
split:
specialized
networks
Model 7
Piecewise
exponential
full model
Model 8
part 1
Heckprobit
selection
equation
Model 8
part 2
Heckman
probit
success
equation
Constant .226 .202 .539 .520 .555 –.087 .077 –7.994 .446 .476
(.241) (.247) (.225)•• (.220)•• (.230)•• (.557) (1.023) (.133)••• (.165)••• (.186)••
N 6,744 6,744 6,744 6,744 6,744 3,374 3,370 9,149 74,184 6,744
Unique investors 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,067 1,016 1,646 1,646 1,646
Unique ventures 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 1,111 1,260 2,371 2,371 2,371
Log pseudo
-likelihood
–4,446 –4,438 –4,424 –4,423 –4,417 –2,183 –2,169 –4,565 –24,575
Wald χ2 400.66 411.78 444.91 445.84 460.03 283.38 269.61 162.08
LR-test 16.62••• 28.92••• 0.86 11.93•••
Correlation
error terms
success-selection
equation
–.088
(.053)•
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by investor, venture, and syndicate size in all models except
model 7, in which standard errors are clustered on syndicate size only. Year dummies (2006–2011), location
dummies (CA, MA, and NY), and dummies for the 32 IT subsectors are included and are jointly significant in all
models. Time effects in model 7 are not shown. The unit of analysis is the venture–investor combination in all
models, except model 7, in which it is the venture–syndicate combination. The sample split in models 6a and 6b is
at sample median values. The sample includes firms that received first-round investment between $250,000 and
$10 million between 2005 and 2011. Second funding is observed until the end of 2013. LR-test assesses
improvement in model fit relative to model in previous column and is based on the log likelihood of the model with
clustered standard errors on investor and venture levels only.
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simulation techniques suggested by Zelner (2009) to graph interaction effects
and confidence intervals, but this method does not support the multiple cluster-
ing of standard errors. Graphs obtained by clustering at only one level show
that the difference in the predicted probability associated with a change in
actors’ knowledge similarity from –1.5 to 1.5 (as depicted in figure 3) is statisti-
cally different from 0 (95 percent confidence) at either end of the network clo-
sure range but not in the middle of the range where the lines intersect.
We also conducted a sample split at median values of actors’ knowledge
similarity (models 6a and 6b) and found consistent support for H1a and H1b. In
line with H1a, figure 3 shows that ventures have a higher probability of success
if their syndicates have closed-diverse networks (A) rather than closed-
specialized (C) or open-diverse networks (D). The higher probability of the suc-
cess of A relative to D is further supported in model 6a, which shows a positive
association between network closure and venture success in diverse networks.
In line with H1b, we found support also for our prediction that ventures benefit
more from open-specialized syndication networks (B) than from closed-
specialized networks (C) or open-diverse networks (D). The higher probability of
venture success associated with B relative to C is supported by a negative
association between closure and venture success in specialized networks in
model 6b. These two findings taken together imply that, in line with H1a and
H1b, there is a positive relationship between network closure and venture suc-
cess if the actors are diverse and a negative relationship between network clo-
sure and venture success if the network actors are specialized.
To further test the robustness of our results, we conducted several addi-
tional analyses, not included here for reasons of space. First, to check for
potential multicollinearity issues, we estimated a variant of model 5 that
Figure 3. Interaction between network closure and actors’ knowledge similarity.*
* The figure is based on the Heckprobit selection model, model 8 in table 3. Year is set to 2005, sector to
mobile, and location to California. All remaining variables are set to sample mean. Note that using different
values for control variables would only shift the regression lines upwards or downwards. Graphs based on
models 5 (standard logit) and 7 (piecewise exponential) are highly consistent with the graph shown.
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included only the investor social capital variables and the interaction term. The
sign and significance level of the coefficients are largely unchanged, suggesting
that multicollinearity is not a concern in our estimations. Second, we reran the
logit models at the venture–syndicate rather than the venture–investor level of
analysis, with investor-level covariates averaged across syndicate members.
Although this setup does not allow us to control for investor-level interdepen-
dence, it enables a neater juxtaposition of the dependent variable at the ven-
ture level and the network explanatory variables at the syndicate level, and it
leads to a more balanced sampling of ventures’ outcomes independent of syn-
dicate size. The results are consistent with those reported in the paper. Finally,
although five-year time windows are common in syndication network research
(Sorenson and Stuart, 2001, 2008), we reran the models with shorter (one-year
and three-year) and longer time spans (no tie decay) for our network variables.
The results were consistent with those reported here.
Structural Holes, Structural Equivalence, and Industry Emergence
Our results show that ventures have the highest chance of success if their syn-
dicates have either closed-diverse or open-specialized networks. These findings
support our theoretical argument that these configurations capture the best of
both worlds, combining non-redundancy of information, which guarantees
access to diverse information, and redundancy of information, which eases its
interpretation. To probe whether these mechanisms are indeed driving our
results, we conducted four further analyses.
First, our argument is based in part on the theoretical assumption that open
networks have more structural holes or bridging ties than closed ones.
Although on average this is likely to be the case—the count of bridging ties and
closure are correlated at –0.25—relatively open networks may have fewer
structural holes if alter–alter ties are more widely distributed rather than being
concentrated among selected groups of alters (see A and B in figure 2). In fact,
the positive correlation between the proportion of bridging ties and closure sug-
gests that the relation between closure and structural holes is not straightfor-
ward. In contexts such as ours, the distribution of bridging ties is skewed.
Bridging ties are relatively rare because collaboration often takes places in
larger groups, which create closure. To gauge the direct effect of bridging ties
as a measure of non-redundancy, in models 9 and 10 of table 4, we replaced
our closure variable with the proportion of bridging ties. Figure 4.A depicts the
results. Consistent with our earlier results, we found that networks with low
levels of bridging (i.e., closed networks) are associated with higher levels of
venture success if these networks are diverse and that networks with high lev-
els of bridging (i.e., open networks) are associated with higher levels of venture
success if these networks are specialized. These results support our reasoning
that structural holes are indeed an important mechanism driving our findings.
Second, another challenge to closure as a measure of redundancy relates to
structural equivalence. Our argument is based on the notion that closure
among a syndicate’s alters is indicative of information redundancy in the net-
work. Although this will hold on average, there may be cases in which alters,
despite being unconnected, have mostly the same information because they
are tied to the same third parties, that is, they are structurally equivalent.
Model 11 tests whether our results hold if we add structural equivalence to our
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Table 4. Logit Models Predicting Probability of Receiving Second Funding (Structural Holes,
Structural Equivalence, and Industry Emergence)*
Variable
Model 5
Full
model for
comparison
Model 9
Bridging
ties main
effect
Model 10
Bridging
ties
interaction
Model 11
Structural
eqv.
Model 12a
Structural eqv.
diverse
networks
(compare 6a)
Model 12b
Structural eqv.
specialized
networks
(compare 6b)
Model 13a
Sample
split:
established
sectors
Model 13b
Sample
split:
emerging
sectors
Venture
Raised amount
1st round
.066 .047 .054 .062 .114 .019 .100 –.041
(.064) (.073) (.072) (.067) (.068)• (.185) (.058)• (.097)
Number of patents .003 .004 .004 .003 .021 .004 .003
(.012) (.011) (.011) (.012) (.019) (.011) (.011)
Number of
trademarks
–.043 –.046 –.047 –.043 –.016 –.070 –.044
(.016)••• (.018)••• (.018)••• (.016)••• (.008)•• (.015)••• (.015)•••
Investor
Share of past portfolio
companies
acquired/IPO
.956 .867 .854 .956 .387 1.653 .708 1.322
(.494)• (.475)• (.473)• (.501)• (.496) (.671)•• (.384)• (.972)
Status (eigenvector
centrality)
3.959 –1.448 –.447 .147 –9.325 –6.169 –.291 20.852
(3.598) (3.984) (4.185) (2.413) (15.112) (7.078) (5.492) (14.996)
Angel investor .180 .175 .190 .187 .132 .660 .050 .700
(.322) (.334) (.322) (.327) (.295) (.653) (.400) (.542)
Corporate venture
capitalist
–.224 –.185 –.186 –.233 –.067 –.547 –.288 .115
(.210) (.188) (.187) (.203) (.178) (.286)• (.244) (.208)
Syndicate
Syndicate size –.077 –.093 –.092 –.075 .009 –.212 –.070 –.070
(.050) (.053)• (.053)• (.054) (.073) (.056)••• (.041)• (.102)
Network size .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .001 .003 –.001
(.001)•• (.001)• (.001)• (.001)••• (.001)•• (.002) (.001)•• (.002)
Network closure .030 –.017 –.054 –.140 .072 –.148
(.064) (.074) (.129) (.064)•• (.073) (.045)•••
Actors’ knowledge
similarity
.061 –.064 –.082 .063 –.000 .347
(.058) (.044) (.039)•• (.054) (.061) (.089)•••
Network closure × Actors’
knowledge similarity
–.035 –.027 –.029 –.073
(.007)••• (.009)••• (.011)••• (.042)•
Bridging ties –.092 –.106
(.038)•• (.061)•
Bridging ties × Actors’
knowledge similarity
.060
(.027)••
Structural equivalence .100 .392 .150
(.040)•• (.159)•• (.131)
Network closure ×
Structural equivalence
–.131 –.026
(.025)••• (.036)
Constant .555 .846 .834 .631 .520 1.452 .561 –.877
(.230)•• (.298)••• (.302)••• (.206)••• (.502) (.354)••• (.194)••• (1.030)
N 6,744 6,410 6,410 6,744 3,374 3,370 5,132 1,612
Unique investors 1,646 1,439 1,439 1,646 1,067 1,016 1,365 744
Unique ventures 2,371 2,229 2,229 2,371 1,111 1,260 1,805 566
Log pseudo-likelihood –4,417 –4,209 –4,205 –4,412 –2,159 –2,169 –3,359 –1,026
Wald χ2 460.03 404.50 402.23 466.71 326.42 264.67 346.92 174.87
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by investor, venture, and syndicate size in all models. Year
dummies (2006–2011), location dummies (CA, MA, and NY), and dummies for the 32 IT subsectors are included
and are jointly significant in all models. The unit of analysis is the venture–investor combination. The sample
includes firms that received first-round investment between $250,000 and $10 million between 2005 and 2011.
Second funding is observed until the end of 2013. Ventures in emerging sectors in our sample have no patents or
trademarks.
 Some observations were dropped, as the proportion of bridging ties is undefined when all network relations are
contained within the syndicate.
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original specification of model 5. The model shows that controlling for redun-
dancy based on structural equivalence does not affect our main result; the
interaction effect between network closure and actors’ knowledge similarity is
substantively unchanged. Overall, structural equivalence among alters has a
positive and significant effect on venture success, suggesting that some over-
lap in the information that alters pass to the syndicate may be beneficial for its
interpretation. This might be because overlap in the second network neighbor-
hood increases the chances that certain bits of information reach the syndicate
through different routes (and potentially in different versions), which allows the
syndicate to interpret the information through triangulation.
But the value of the structural equivalence of alters—that is, redundancy in
the second network neighborhood—may just as well be contingent on the
redundancy emanating from closure and actors’ knowledge similarity in the first
network neighborhood. Models 12a and 12b are sample split analyses that
mimic the approach in models 6a and 6b. There, we see how the value of clo-
sure in diverse or specialized networks may depend on the level of structural
equivalence. One would expect that the value of closed-diverse networks to
new ventures might be reduced if structural equivalence is high. If the syndi-
cate’s alters get their information largely from the same sources, information
diversity might be less than one would conclude from considering only closure
among the alters. Conversely, in open-diverse networks, problems of informa-
tion overload due to excessive non-redundancy might be mitigated if structural
equivalence among alters is high. Despite the alters not being directly con-
nected, information diversity is limited because they rely on the same third-
party sources. Model 12a and figure 4.B support these intuitions.
Similar reasoning can be applied to specialized networks. The value of open-
specialized networks could be compromised if the syndicate’s unconnected
alters use the same third-party sources. The non-redundancy emanating from a
sparse first neighborhood structure is limited if alters are structurally equivalent.
Also, we might expect that problems of overembeddedness are exacerbated if
redundancy is also high in the second neighborhood of the network. But model
12b does not support this reasoning. Although the main effect of closure in a
specialized network remains negative—keeping our evidence for the value of
open-specialized networks intact—the level of structural equivalence appears
neither to reduce the advantages of open-specialized networks nor to reinforce
the disadvantages of closed-specialized ones.
Third, we have argued that the advantage of closure in closed-diverse net-
works and the disadvantage of a lack of closure in open-diverse networks are
based on two mechanisms: the known mechanism that cohesion of shared
third parties around a tie pushes actors to put more effort into the exchange
(Reagans and McEvily, 2003) and our newly proposed mechanism that closure
among diverse actors enables the triangulation of diverse interpretive cues of
the same information. Controlling for tie strength in model 6a does not reduce
the magnitude or significance of the positive effect of closure in diverse net-
works. Assuming the tie strength variable to be a more direct measure of aug-
mented effort, we consider this result indirect evidence that the logic of
triangulation we proposed indeed plays an important part in the advantages
derived from closed-diverse networks and disadvantages of open-diverse
networks.
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Finally, we have so far portrayed the two best-of-both-worlds network con-
figurations—closed-diverse and open-specialized—as equally beneficial in
terms of information advantages. To shed light on how the mechanisms driving
advantage in these configurations differ, we explore whether the venture’s
level of technological uncertainty, a crucial external contingency (e.g.,
Khandwalla, 1977), influences the relative impact of these two network struc-
tures. We exploited a change in the classification in CrunchBase data to distin-
guish between ventures in established and emerging sectors. Up to the end of
2013, CrunchBase employed 11 classes to categorize IT and Internet industry
subclasses. These related mostly to the technical underpinnings of IT and
included fields such as hardware, network hosting, search, and security, as
well as relatively established areas of application such as e-commerce and
video games. In 2014, CrunchBase introduced a more inclusive classification
scheme including 32 sectors, and it retrospectively recoded all the ventures in
its database. The 21 additional sectors refer mostly to new IT application areas,
notably mobile apps. We labeled the 11 original categories established sectors
and the 21 new ones emerging sectors. The proportion of first-round invest-
ments in emerging sectors in our sample increased from around 15 percent in
2005, our earliest observation year, to more than 30 percent in 2011, the last
year observed.
In table 4, models 13a and 13b present the logit analysis for the sample split
into ventures in established and emerging sectors. The interaction between
network closure and actors’ knowledge similarity is negative and significant in
both models. Figures 4.C and 4.D, however, show remarkable differences in
the values for open-specialized and closed-diverse networks for ventures in
emerging and established sectors, respectively. New ventures in established
sectors are most likely to be successful if their syndicates have closed-diverse
networks, while ventures in emerging sectors benefit most from syndicates
with open-specialized networks. To be clear, for both types of ventures, the
nature of the interplay remains unchanged: as in the full sample, the relation-
ship between closure and success is negative in specialized networks and posi-
tive in diverse networks. But there is a shift in the point at which the lines
describing the relationship between closure and venture success for specia-
lized and diverse networks intersect.
The differences between the value of closed-diverse and open-specialized
networks may be due to variety in the former configuration being based on
diversity in insights from different domains and the latter being limited to var-
iation within domains. Between-domain variety in closed-diverse networks
may be particularly valuable in settings in which lock-in to established and
taken-for-granted views is a potential risk (see Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin,
1956; Uzzi, 1997). At the same time, interpretation of between-domain vari-
ety would benefit from a collaborative approach with the involvement of
shared third parties, which are numerous in closed-diverse networks. In con-
trast, within-domain variety accessed via open-specialized networks may be
better suited to settings in which views have not yet become established
(see Brown and Duguid, 1998). When there is little consensus about what
might be good for firms within a particular field, a variety of views from
experts with different experience within a particular field may be more valu-
able than different views from across field boundaries. Given that variety is
mostly within-domain, independent interpretation without the involvement of
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shared third parties may be sufficient. This might explain our finding that
open-specialized networks are particularly beneficial for ventures in emerging
sectors.
DISCUSSION
We have argued that the information advantages of social capital are embodied
in the combination of non-redundant information, which provides access to
diverse insights, and redundant information, which eases their interpretation.
These advantages can be derived from either closed networks among dissimi-
lar actors or open networks among similar actors. We found that new ventures
benefit most from the social capital of their investors and thus are more likely
to be successful at attracting additional funding if their initial investors’ net-
works are closed-diverse or open-specialized. These two configurations are
associated with higher levels of venture success than open-diverse networks,
in which investors have limited means to interpret diverse information, and
closed-specialized networks, in which the diversity of information is too limited.
Redundancy, Non-redundancy, and Social Capital
In the literature on network structure, both redundancy and non-redundancy
are considered pivotal to the information advantages derived from social capital,
resulting in a longstanding debate over whether open structures with non-
redundant information or closed structures with redundant information provide
more valuable information (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004). Our findings imply that to
benefit from networks, actors need both redundancy and non-redundancy of
information. Looking at only the dichotomy between open and closed struc-
tures cannot explain how these two properties are combined. By bringing
actors’ knowledge similarity into the open-versus-closed-networks debate, we
argue that redundancy can stem from the similarity of actors’ knowledge in
open networks with non-redundant information, and non-redundancy can come
from the dissimilarity of actors in closed networks with high levels of structural
redundancy.
Informational advantages associated with social capital may be maximized
when redundancy and non-redundancy of information coexist, because the for-
mer aids interpretation and the latter safeguards diversity. Actors may benefit
from non-redundant information in open networks if they have some knowl-
edge similarity with information providers that yields shared interpretive
schema and creates redundancy between the received information and actors’
prior knowledge. Actors may benefit from non-redundant information in diverse
networks if they can rely on joint third parties whose interpretation of the infor-
mation from their perspective creates redundancy and enables triangulation.
Conversely, combined non-redundancy from open networks and from actor dis-
similarity can lead to problems of information overload in open-diverse net-
works, while combined redundancy from closed networks and from high
similarity of actors’ knowledge leads to problems of overembeddedness (Uzzi,
1997).
Our findings support the growing consensus that network structure is insuf-
ficient to explain the value of social capital (Kwon and Adler, 2014). Social capi-
tal research has a long tradition of structuralist studies (Kilduff and Brass, 2010)
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that attribute much of the variance in performance outcomes to differences in
network position and network structure but that may not sufficiently take into
account explanations based on actors’ heterogeneity (Reagans and McEvily,
2003; Rodan and Galunic, 2004), network content (Chua, Ingram, and Morris,
2008; Sosa, 2011), or diversity in the information environment (Aral and Van
Alstyne, 2011). We show that the value actors obtain from the network is a
function of the actors’ structural positions, the similarity of their knowledge,
and the interplay between these two factors, which suggests that the effects
of network structure (or content, for that matter) cannot be studied in isolation.
Actors’ knowledge similarity is an important contingency in the value of net-
work structure and sheds light on the boundary conditions when structural
holes and closure advantages apply.
Interpreting Diverse Information in Networks
Network actors’ ability to interpret information is also an integral component of
social capital. Rather than assuming that actors in open or diverse networks are
able to interpret all the information they access, we have highlighted two
network-level mechanisms that facilitate the effective interpretation of non-
redundant or diverse information: overlap in actors’ knowledge profiles and tri-
angulation via shared third parties.
The relative similarity in knowledge profiles among actors in open-specialized
networks creates potential overlap between the information they receive and
the information they may already have. This information redundancy makes it
more straightforward to overcome potential interpretive barriers and surmount
the limitations imposed by the lower transmission capacity typical of sparse
network structures (Shannon and Weaver, 1948; Simon and Feigenbaum,
1964). Our argument offers new insights relative to extant research on struc-
tural holes in which the actors bridging such holes are often assumed to be
able to combine and integrate knowledge and use it to their own advantage,
regardless of their knowledge similarity to information providers. Although bro-
kers may to some extent benefit from diverse information merely through the
perspective-broadening effect it has on the ‘‘engaged mind’’ (Burt, 2010), this
strand of work treats the interpretive ability of network actors largely as a nodal
property that is exogenous to the network, and thus it usually falls short of the-
orizing the process explicitly (Burt, 2004).
Our results imply that structural holes may be expected to have negative
effects in heterogeneous information environments and positive effects in set-
tings in which the information environment is relatively homogeneous and the
interpretation of relatively diverse information is less problematic. This is in line
with earlier work (Burt, 2005) showing that bankers can improve their perfor-
mance by spanning structural holes in a professional context in which—in our
words—diversity among actors is low. We would encourage further research in
different contexts to understand whether and how the value of structural holes
is contingent on the level of actors’ knowledge similarity and the diversity of
the information environment more generally.
Another mechanism facilitating the interpretation of diverse information is tri-
angulation via shared third parties. When the diversity of information stems
from the dissimilarity of the actors in a network rather than from structural
holes, shared third-party connections act as an important mechanism that helps
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actors interpret information in the network. These arguments extend earlier
work on actors’ knowledge similarity and diversity in closed networks. Reagans
and McEvily (2003) hinted at the possibility that a combination of high network
closure and diverse actors may be the optimal network structure, although they
did not directly examine the interplay between these two factors and did not
point to the value of the combination of similar actors in networks with low lev-
els of closure. Similar to Tortoriello and Krackhardt’s (2010) findings in the con-
text of ties across intra-organizational boundaries, we find that the advantages
of diversity from across domain boundaries are best realized in closed net-
works rich in shared connections.
Shared third parties not only encourage two connected actors to deepen the
level of their exchange (Reagans and McEvily, 2003) but also may contribute
directly to corroborating the information by providing a platform for collective
interpretation (Gavetti and Warglien, 2015). If a focal actor receives the informa-
tion directly from the original source and also receives the interpreted and
adapted version from a shared dissimilar alter, that actor can triangulate the dif-
ferent versions of the same story and make inferences about his or her own
interpretation (Weick and Roberts, 1993). Tightly knit groups of interconnected,
dissimilar actors can function as a platform for distributed cognition allowing for
the meaningful interpretation and application of even highly novel and unfami-
liar information (Michel, 2007). This advantage from closure is specific to
closed-diverse networks, because closed-specialized networks with homoge-
neous actors are unlikely to show major differences in the interpretation of the
same information. In fact, the negative effect of closed-specialized networks
on ventures’ success may be driven in part by the risks of groupthink, which
emerge when the views of tightly interconnected groups achieve convergence
without these views being challenged by relative outsiders (Janis, 1972). These
findings relate directly to Uzzi’s (1997) discussion of overembeddedness as a
disadvantage because inflowing novel perspectives are limited by an emphasis
on strong, embedded ties in dense network structures. We add that this lack
of inflow of diverse information will be particularly salient if high levels of
actors’ knowledge similarity and high levels of network closure coincide.
Sources of Diverse Information
Finally, we have portrayed various sources of diverse information. In our frame-
work, diverse information is derived either from embeddedness in open net-
works rich in structural holes or from embeddedness in networks of
heterogeneous actors. We build on a growing body of research on actors’ het-
erogeneity (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Rodan and Galunic, 2004; Tortoriello,
McEvily, and Krackhardt, 2015) and network content (Chua, Ingram, and
Morris, 2008; Sosa, 2011) as additional sources of information diversity, and
we challenge the assumption that actors’ knowledge diversity typically coin-
cides with low levels of network closure (Reagans, Zuckerman, and McEvily,
2004) while actors’ knowledge similarity coincides with high levels of network
closure (Uzzi, 1997). We found these two sources of diversity to be substitutes
rather than complements. Problems of information overload occur when actors
are faced with diverse information due to both actors’ heterogeneity and net-
work structure. This finding contrasts with Rodan and Galunic’s (2004) study of
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managers’ networks, which suggests that actors’ heterogeneity and structural
holes are mutually reinforcing sources of diversity.
Proposing network structure and actors’ knowledge similarity as distinct
sources of information diversity raises questions about the extent to which
structural holes and actors’ diversity capture the same type of information
diversity. Despite finding network sparseness and actors’ heterogeneity to be
mutually reinforcing, Rodan and Galunic (2004) also found that the main effect
of structural holes on innovation disappears if a direct measure of diversity is
included in the equation. This suggests that, in the context of their study, net-
work sparseness functioned as a proxy for diversity. In our setting, however,
the frequent occurrence of closed-diverse networks and open-specialized net-
works suggests that neither network openness nor closure is necessarily indi-
cative of the level of actors’ knowledge similarity. Also, post-hoc analysis
contrasting established and emerging sectors showed that the two sources of
diversity are not perfectly equivalent. Closed-diverse networks are most
strongly associated with venture success in established IT subsectors because
they can offer cross-domain diversity that can help challenge established
assumptions and taken-for-granted views. Open-specialized networks have
within-domain diversity that appears particularly beneficial for ventures in emer-
ging subsectors, in which assumptions and views are still emerging. These
findings complement those of Bellavitis and colleagues (2014) who showed
that extra-industry networks positively affect ventures’ performance, while
intra-industry networks have a negative effect unless these networks are com-
plemented by strong extra-industry ties.
We also shed light on the different roles of information diversity at different
levels in the network. Although our story revolves mainly around the value of
redundant and non-redundant information from the first neighborhood of the
syndication network (syndicate members’ prior partners), we have also demon-
strated how the value of such (non-)redundancy can be enhanced or reduced
by (non-)redundancy in the second neighborhood (the third parties that inform
the syndicate’s prior partners). We found that the advantages of closed-diverse
networks are undermined if diversity is reduced by syndicate alters having
highly overlapping third-party sources, while the problem of excess diversity in
open-diverse networks is mitigated when equivalence is high. Accordingly, we
suggest that the benefits of balance between structure and actors’ knowledge
diversity documented for the first neighborhood network may also be attainable
beyond that level. Future research could further investigate these tradeoffs.
Suggestions for Future Research
Our study has several shortcomings that suggest directions for future research.
First, our findings relate to the indirect effect of network structure and actors’
knowledge similarity on desired performance outcomes. Although the mechan-
isms we describe have strong validity based on prior work on the effects of
investors’ social capital on venture performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu,
2007; Hallen, 2008), more work is needed to achieve a more fine-grained
understanding of the type of advice syndicates bring to their portfolio compa-
nies and how it contributes to their success. For example, we provide indirect
evidence that investor syndicates in closed-diverse networks benefit from the
corroboration of diverse interpretive cues through triangulation, which affects
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the advice they give to ventures. Qualitative and experimental research could
provide more evidence of this mechanism as a crucial driver of information
advantage in closed-diverse networks. Also, although we tested for the alterna-
tive explanation that ventures with investor syndicates with the best-of-both-
worlds networks are more successful because these networks allow the syndi-
cates to select more promising ventures in the first place, we acknowledge
that our approach may not have ruled out endogeneity entirely.
Second, various contextual factors are not accounted for in this study but
have been highlighted in prior research on social capital as important contingen-
cies related to the value of structural holes and network closure. There is a near
consensus in the literature that structural holes are conducive to idea genera-
tion and knowledge creation and that network closure is beneficial for the
implementation of ideas and innovation (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). Research has
also suggested that closure and brokerage effects differ in relation to the time
required for their manifestation (Soda, Usai, and Zaheer, 2004; Baum, McEvily,
and Rowley, 2012). We do not claim to know the extent to which these expla-
nations are compatible with our actors’ knowledge similarity approach.
Third, actors’ knowledge similarity is not exogenous to the network struc-
ture. Both network structure and actors’ knowledge similarity are based on the
set of investments in the five years prior to the focal investment. Thus every
syndicated co-investment creates a tie while also rendering the investors
slightly more similar in their investment focus. Although this situation mimics
reality—collaboration makes actors more similar over time (Cowan and Jonard,
2009)—the use of exogenously determined actors’ attributes might help to dis-
entangle redundancy from network structural effects and redundancy related
to actors’ attributes. Future research could use actors’ knowledge similarity
measures based on, for example, text analysis of documents that characterize
the actors’ knowledge profiles, which are separate from network data sources.
It could also help to unravel the complex theoretical interdependencies
between network structures and actors’ knowledge attributes that drive the
formation of closed-diverse, closed-specialized, open-diverse, and open-
specialized networks.
Finally, we confined the testing of our hypotheses to the specifics of syndi-
cation networks and their effect on ventures. Our study not only highlighted
the value of closed-diverse and open-specialized networks relative to open-
diverse and closed-specialized ones, it also pinpointed the difference in value
between the two best-of-both-worlds network configurations for ventures in
emerging versus established sectors. Although both closed-diverse and open-
specialized networks combine diversity and interpretation advantages, the com-
plex challenge of interpreting diverse information from across sectoral bound-
aries seems best handled in closed networks, which may not only be stronger
(Hansen, 1999) but also offer built-in mechanisms for collective interpretation
of unfamiliar or complex information. By contrast, the value of structural holes
seems confined to more homogenous information environments contained
within knowledge domains. We hope that our study offers a valuable and com-
prehensive theoretical framework with which future research can continue to
explore, in a broader range of contexts, how the diversity (dis)advantages of
open network structures and of actors’ knowledge heterogeneity and the inter-
pretation advantages of network closure and actors’ knowledge homogeneity
interplay. Although we would predict that the value of closed-diverse and open-
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specialized networks and the dangers of open-diverse and closed-specialized
networks will apply to other settings, such as firms’ innovation alliances, it may
be that some informational advantages as portrayed in this study may be partic-
ularly pertinent in the context of early-stage investments. In that context, social
capital advantages can be expected to be strongly manifested because inves-
tors’ advice at that stage should have a formative impact on the venture itself,
including its business model and organizational design, compared with later-
stage investments or alliances between established firms, in which the focus
may be on growing an existing idea to reach a more-refined technology devel-
opment stage, new customer segments, or new geographic areas.
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